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The Impact of Tax Reform on New Car Purchases in Ireland 1. Introduction
Private car transport accounted for approximately 12% of total CO 2 emissions in Ireland in 2006 (O'Gallachoir et al, 2009 ). This represented a significant increase over time, both in absolute terms and in terms of its share of total emissions. Transport 1 , as a whole, accounted for around 36% of total CO 2 emissions in this period. The transport sector was identified as a serious cause for concern to policymakers due to its unsustainable dependence on oil and its negative environmental impacts. The National Climate Change Strategy Ireland (NCCSI, 2007) The number of private cars in Ireland has risen significantly in the last two decades.
This has led to a noticeable convergence in the number of cars per thousand between Ireland and its European counterparts. This is a crude measure for comparing levels of car ownership across countries. Although a deep recession has delayed many of the negative trends in private car transport, this does not mean that private car transport has become more sustainable. The recent depression led to a collapse in new car sales, but new car sales have now started to recover. Government policy can significantly influence this purchase decision though taxation (Mayeres and Proost, 2001; Verboven, 2002; Ryan et al. 2009 ).
Private car transport produces many negative externalities, particularly in relation to the environment (Mayeres and Proost, 2001 ). This provides a further rationale for government intervention. Taxation can achieve a reduction in this negative externality (Baumol, 1972) . This can be done in terms of a tax which taxes emissions directly or 1 This refers to the two digit NACE code 36 which covers all aspects of transport including freight indirectly though a differential taxation regime on purchase. The EU have set emission targets for new cars that enter the car fleet. They have adopted a target of 130 g/km CO2
for weighted new car sales by 2015 and 110 g/km CO2 by 2020 (European Commission, 2002 , 2005 . As noted in Kunert and Kuhfeld (2007) , Ryan et al. (2009), and Mandell (2009) , there is a European consensus to move away from purchase taxes and move towards use taxes which are differentiated by emissions. The European Commission also proposes abolishment of registration taxes. Ireland has no indigenous car manufacturing industry and is thus a technology taker. Because it is such a small market, tax changes in Ireland will have a negligible effect on the design of cars. However, car manufacturers will respond to a coordinated policy change across the entire European Union.
In July 2008, the car tax structure was changed in Ireland. Taxation on new private cars is now based on (expected) emissions per kilometre rather than engine size. This change affects both the purchase price and the ownership costs of all new private cars but has no effect on the usage costs. This has no direct effect on carbon dioxide emissions. A more efficient fleet will only result in lower emissions if there is no change in mileage.
Similar schemes exist in many other European countries. In 2002, the UK introduced a carbon-differentiated vehicle taxation policy. This policy was also accompanied by a modified benefit-in-kind tax policy on company cars to encourage purchase of more efficient vehicles. However, this policy only impacted on the ownership cost per year and had no effect on initial purchase cost. The difference between the tax bands was substantially smaller compared to the Irish system (VCA, 2008) . This taxation system changed again in April 2010. Although there still remains only one type of vehicle tax, the revamped tax further encouraged the purchase of low emitting vehicles. 'First-year taxes' are such that low emitting cars are exempt from vehicle tax in the first year in contrast to high emitting vehicles that are penalised heavily in the first year. Sweden has previously utilised a car taxation policy similar to Ireland. Although they have no direct purchase taxes, Sweden has offered a subsidy (~€1000/car) to encourage the purchase of environmentally friendly cars. This policy was used in conjunction with carbondifferentiated ownership taxes which had the effect of encouraging the purchase of cars with emissions of under 120 g/km. This system was intended to remain in operation until 2010 but was amended in 2009 due to the unexpectedly large sales that it caused (Mandell, 2009) . The subsidy was replaced by a five year exemption from motor tax.
There are various reasons for adopting a new tax regime that switches tax incidence onto emissions rather than engine size. As we show in the paper, there is not perfect correlation between engine size and emissions and thus this tax change has significant effects for the market share of each fuel type. This also means that the tax change will create a structural break when projecting emissions from private car transport.
In this paper, we present a methodology to explain the significant effect the recent tax change has had on the fuel share of new car sales in Ireland. Section 2 surveys the relevant literature. Section 3 discussed the data used in the analysis. Section 4 presents the methodology. Section 5 discusses the results. Finally, Section 6 offers conclusions.
Previous Research
Since the late 1980s, the share of diesel cars has increased steadily across Europe (Pock, 2010) . However, the environmental benefit of diesel cars over petrol cars is contentious (Verboven, 2002; Mayeres and Proost, 2001) . In terms of CO2 emissions, diesel cars are superior due to their higher fuel efficiency. However, diesel engines produce higher NO x emissions and also produce particulates (North et al., 2006) . Improvements in the diesel engine, like the introduction of turbo and direct injection, have helped to reduce the gap considerably between petrol and diesel cars in important physical attributes like acceleration and speed (Verboven, 2002; Mayeres and Proost, 2001 ). This has had the effect of making the two fuel types closer substitutes in terms of consumer preferences.
However, these two fuels are treated very differently across European countries in terms of taxation policy. These heterogeneous taxation policies largely explain the different penetration rates of diesel in the European Union (Ryan et al., 2009) The share of diesel sales varies considerably across European countries (See Figure 2 ).
There are three types of taxation that affect the car purchase decision -purchase, ownership and usage. The rates applied to these vary significantly. Kunert and Kuhfeld (2007) (SMMT, 2007) . However, the UK system penalizes high emissions far less than the current Irish system. The recent change to incorporate 'first-year taxes' somewhat addresses this imbalance.
Many studies have looked at modeling vehicle choice (Bresnahan and Schmalensee (1987 ), Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995 , 1999 , Brownstone and Train (1999) ) and the effect of the various car attributes on this choice. These papers attempt to model the various levels of product heterogeneity, which are apparent in car choice decisions.
Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) provide the seminal work in this area using a random coefficient logit model to investigate vehicle choice. This type of model provides more realistic substitution patterns than the traditional logit model. This methodology produces higher cross-price elasticities for cars with more similar attributes. This model uses knowledge of income distribution to infer willingness to pay estimates for the various products attributes. However, this model has not been applied explicitly to the fuel choice decision.
Pock ( taxes has a larger effect on car choice than the change in purchase tax. They predict an increase (6%) in the market share of diesel cars. This is very much against recent observed data which suggests that the share of diesel cars has actually increased from 25% to 57% (CSO, 2010)
Data
We use car and mileage data. The car data is collected from a variety of sources. The mileage data is constructed by the CSO and has been disaggregated by engine size, fuel type and age.
The car prices, disaggregated by 9 engine categories, are taken from Society of Irish
Motoring Industry (SIMI). Before the tax change, the average difference between petrol and diesel was approximately €2000. This is in line with previous estimates (Verboven, 2002; Ryan et al., 2009) . Fuel prices are taken from the AA database of fuel prices. These are annual prices which are normalised across the year and the country. Diesel prices have been historically lower then petrol prices in Ireland (see Figure A1 ). However, this trend was reversed in 2007 but has since returned. In terms of the model, the relative difference in purchase prices and fuel prices between the two fuel types is the desired input value. We assume homogenous maintenance costs and that the resale value of the car is a function of the initial purchase price including taxes. Other car attributes like horsepower, speed and size are assumed to be homogenous to a first approximation as in
Verboven (2002) The use of mileage distribution data when evaluating car purchase decisions is limited in the literature. 5 The random coefficient model of Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) allows for the use of distributional data to examine heterogeneity in consumer preferences. In their paper, they use income and demographic distributional data.
However, no mention of mileage distribution is included in this paper or any subsequent paper using this type of methodology. Our mileage distribution data is provided by the CSO. This dataset uses two types of administrative data to construct estimates of annual mileage disaggregated by engine size, fuel type and age. First, it uses data collected from the National Car Test (NCT) which constructs estimates of mileage based on odometer readings. This procedure is described and analysed in Kelly et al. (2009 The mileage data used in this analysis is based on odometer readings. In Hennessy and
Tol (2010), we examined mileage distribution using the Household Budget Survey (HBS)
which asks an explicit question on annual mileage. There is evidence of rounding error around the mean value (16,000 km). There is some evidence in the literature to suggest that mileage estimates from survey data may be biased (Prieger (2005); Staplin et al. (2008) ). This arises because respondents essentially answer a question that they have never precisely measured. However, at an aggregated level we find little to justify this assertion, assuming that our odometer estimates in 2005 are an accurate representation of the population (see Figure A2 ). In the HBS, we are only able to disaggregate by average engine size per household and thus mileage distributions by engine size will not be as accurate.
We examine the aggregate distribution of mileage from the year 1999 to 2008 (see Figure 3 ). The proportion of cars that can be described as high mileage cars (> 25,000km) remains constant over the time period. The biggest change is in the low to medium mileage cars. We see that there are now more cars that drive fewer kilometres than in 1999. This can be partially explained by the increase in the number of multi-car households.
The main advantage of complete distributional data is that it allows us to identify the relevant market for a more efficient engine type. Consumers who drive the least will care little about the savings of driving a more efficient car and thus be heavily influenced by initial purchase price. Figure 4 shows that the shapes of the distribution are significantly different between engines sizes. High (low) mileage and large (small) engines go together.
Model
We quantify the effect of the recent tax change in Ireland which has switched the incidence of taxation from engine size to carbon dioxide emissions. We are interested in the fuel share given an exogenous car stock disaggregated by engine size 7 . We construct a total life-cycle cost model which estimates a mileage break-even point. At any point greater than this break-even point, a rational agent will opt for the more efficient car and choose a diesel. The costs of a car consist of the purchase price, the operational cost, the maintenance cost and resell value (1). These can be compared across both fuel types. We assume that the various attributes within comparative engine size of petrol and diesel cars are homogeneous to a first approximation (Rouwendahl and De Fries (1999) ; Verboven
The total life-cycle cost of car ownership is given by:
• C i is the net present cost of a car of type I;
• P is the purchase price;
• α is the value added tax and stamp duty;
• β is the vehicle registration tax;
• M is the annual maintenance;
• γ is the annual motor tax;
• π is the price of fuel;
• δ is the excise duty on fuel;
• ε is the fuel efficiency of the car;
• D is the annual distance drive;
• ρ is the discount rate;
• T is the life-time of the car; and
• S is the sell value of the car.
If we hold all parameters constant over time and at their current value (as a car buyer might), then (1) simplifies to:
Diesels are more expensive to buy but cheaper to drive. For the same life-time, the breakeven distance is given by:
where the Δs denote the difference between car type i and j.
Equation (3) gives the break-even distances for each engine size. We evaluate this preand post-tax reform, keeping all other variables constant. We do so for each engine size.
This is important as the computed efficiency advantage of diesel over petrol varies by engine size. We follow Verboven (2002) , assuming that anyone with a mileage above the break-even distance buys a diesel car. The market share of diesel cars thus follows from the mileage distribution shown in Figure 4 . We calibrate the discount rate against observed market shares in 2007.
We integrated this break-even distance model into the ISus Car Model. This model is described in Hennessy and Tol (2010) and it forecasts the private car stock in Ireland out to 2025. It provides forecasts of the number of cars disaggregated by engine size, age and fuel type. It also provides forecast of mileage by engine size and fuel type. This allows us to examine the effect of the tax change in relation to emissions. There is also a tax component of this model which allows us to project the amount of tax revenue generated by private car taxation.
Results
In this section, we discuss the results of the model with specific details of the changes in relative break-even distance and how this along with the distribution of mileage by engine size affects the market share of diesels. We use the cumulative mileage distribution in 2008 as it best represents the current population. We conduct a number of different simulations to examine the different effects on the share of diesel cars per engine size.
Baseline Scenario
Our baseline specification includes all aspects of current government car taxation policy. As discussed previously, this includes a purchase tax (VRT) and an ownership tax (Motor tax) based on CO 2 emissions rather than engine size as before 2008. Table 1 shows the taxes before and after the 2008 reform. We find a substantial effect overall, varying by engine size. The break-even distance figures are shown in Table 2 and Figure   4 . The effect of the tax reform is greatest in the medium size car market. It has little effect on the small size car market where the tax change has benefited both diesel and petrol. Furthermore, smaller cars tend to be driven less far. This effect is also evident for large cars (over 2 litre engine) where petrol cars have lost substantial market share.
However, the tax reform has also meant that this segment of the car market has decreased. Table 3 shows the impact on market share.
Our impact estimates are greater than the impact found of similar schemes in the literature (Lehman et al., 2003; Mandell, 2009 ). However, as discussed previously, this particular tax reform is far larger than the scheme's that have been analysed in the previous studies. When it is compared against the VED scheme in the UK, the Irish band based system has a much wider range than the UK system (see Table A1 ). This, along with the system of no car purchase taxes in the UK, explains why of the Irish carbondifferential tax scheme has such a large effect.
Decomposition
We apply the model to a scenario where only the purchase price changed as a result of the tax change. This reduces the purchase price of lower emission cars. It has no direct effect on annual ownership taxes or annual usage costs. We find a substantial effect in the predicted market share of diesels by engine size (Table 4 ) when compared with the observed shares of diesels before the tax change.
We also apply the model to a scenario where only the ownership cost changes as a result of the tax change. This imposes solely an annual cost on car ownership regardless of usage. The simulation results are reported in Table 5 . Again, we see a substantial increase in the 'dieselisation' rate across the medium to large engine classes.
It is apparent that the overall effect of the ownership tax reform is larger than that of the purchase tax reform. This confirms previous literature (Ryan et al., 2009; Giblin and McNabola, 2009; Mandell, 2009 ).
Effect of Tax Reform on Government Revenue
We examine the impact of the tax change on government revenue. The motor tax reform only affects cars registered after June 2008. Thus, it takes time for this tax change to have a significant effect on motor tax revenue (see Figure 5 ). By 2025, the tax shortfall will be as much as €400 million compared to the situation of unreformed taxes. This assumes that motor tax rates remain constant.
In contrast, the effect on Vehicle Registration Tax revenue is immediate. As new car sales have fallen sharply due to the severe recession, there has been a collapse in VRT revenue. However, with the advent of the tax reform, a return to "normal" car sales will not mean a return to pre-reform VRT revenues. Figure 5 shows that a significant short fall will emerge in VRT revenue. This effect depends on the rate of recovery in the economy which affects both the amount and cost of cars being purchased (see Table 6 ).
Giblin and McNabola (2009) estimate that based on annual sales of approximately
130,000 new cars, the shortfall in tax revenue will be €181 million. This is broadly similar with the estimates derived in this analysis (see Table 6 ).
A carbon tax was introduced in late 2009 in Ireland. This has placed an extra unit cost on each litre of fuel consumed. The carbon tax raises the price of a litre of petrol by 4.2 cents and the price of diesel by 4.9 cent. This reflects the higher carbon content in diesel fuel. Table 7 shows the projected tax revenue, which exceeds the revenue foregone by the motor and vehicle registration tax reform in the first year (2010) 
Emissions and Tax Revenue Lost per Tonne of Carbon Dioxide
Tax reform impacts carbon dioxide emissions. There are two effects. First, the fuel efficiency of cars improves as drivers switch from petrol to diesel. Table 7 shows that the effect is relatively modest -about 0.1 million tonnes of carbon dioxide, compared to some 6.0 mln tCO 2 for total private transport emissions. However, higher fuel efficiency implies lower driving costs. If we include this rebound effect, carbon dioxide emissions still fall, but only by a little bit. See Table 7 . is a transfer from the government to owner and drivers of cars. Nevertheless, the government is responsible for meeting the targets for greenhouse gas emission reduction -and it can meet such targets through the purchase of certified emission credits, which tend to trade at a price slightly below ETS permits.
Conclusions
This paper studies the impact of shifting vehicle registration and motor taxes from engine size to potential emissions, as introduced in Ireland in July 2008. This has led to a substantial shift to diesel cars, particularly for larger engines. We estimate that the overall market share of diesels will increase from 25% to 58% as a direct result of the tax reform.
As a result, the revenues from the vehicle registration tax dropped instantaneously and permanently; while the revenues from the motor tax drop gradually over time as the car stock adjusts to the new pattern of car sales. The government introduced a carbon tax on transport fuels in November 2009. In the long run, the extra revenue from the carbon tax is about 1/6 of the revenue foregone from the vehicle registration and motor taxes.
Although the tax burden has shifted from car ownership to carbon use, the overall tax burden has fallen. Because diesel cars are more fuel efficient, carbon dioxide emissions fall but only modestly. As travel costs fall, people may well drive more; correcting for this rebound effect, the drop in emissions is minimal. As a consequence, the cost to the revenue per tonne of carbon dioxide avoided is high if not very high.
These results come with a number of caveats. First, the model predicts a large shift from petrol to diesel. This has been consistently observed over the last 18 months. While this is a welcome validation of the model, car sales were at an exceptionally low level because of the depression of the Irish economy. Our predictions should be checked with data once the economy has returned to normal. Second, we foresee a reduction in tax revenue of half a billion euro per year. This is probably not acceptable given the fiscal situation. It is therefore likely that tax rates will be adjusted upwards. Tax bands may also be changed. The lowest band at present is 120 g/km and this gives no incentive to purchase a 90 g/km car over a 119 g/km car. This problem will be highlighted as larger numbers of low emissions hybrid cars come onto the market. Thirdly, we use a simple car purchase model, calibrated with aggregate data. The robustness of our results should be checked against more detailed models estimated with micro-data. The same is true for our assumptions about distance driven. All this is deferred to future research. 
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